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1. Introduction 
 
 
This article aims to provide with an understanding of a receiving country’s response 
to the competition of the sending countries in international labour market. It is now 
commonly believed that international migration via remittances, networks, human 
capital investments etc. substantially benefits the developing countries. The 
governments of many Asian and Latin American countries now have programmes to 
send migrants to the rich and developed countries. Through these programmes, the 
sending countries compete with each other in international labour market.  References 
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of such competition can be found in governments’ reports or newspapers articles. The 
migration literature however is relatively limited in addressing this issue. 
The discussions available in policy papers and newspaper articles about on-
going competition of countries are to some extent vague. For example, the report of 
the International Organization for Migration on labour market in Asia (IOM, 2003) 
makes several comments on competition (e.g. page 21, 39, 73) without any detailed 
analysis. However, the report mentioned that the competition is severely undermining 
the bargaining power of the countries as they are seeking to balance ‘promotion’ of 
overseas employment and ‘protection’ of migrants. The presence of on-going 
competition among stakeholders can be also noticed by studying the bilateral 
migration agreements and/or labour recruitment procedures of contractual/temporary 
migrant workers. One example is Canada’s Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program, 
which has two different bilateral agreements with Mexico and Caribbean countries for 
temporary migration of agricultural labour. In 2001, Canada for the first time decided 
to meet the two counterparts to negotiate wage related issues, but the agricultural 
employers in Canada objected, fearing an increase of bargaining power of workers 
(Verma 2003, page 60). We also observe competition of countries for labour 
migration in the Persian Gulf countries. The Gulf countries, i.e. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Oman, Bahrain, UAE and Qatar are the major importers of migrant labour in the 
Asian region. The Gulf news (http://gulfnews.com/) and other newspapers of Asia 
from time to time publish news concerning migration. An explicit note on competition 
is available in Migrants Right (Migrants Right, 2008) where it mentioned a case of a 
50% decrease in the demand for Filipino housemaids following an increase in the 
reservation wage rate of housemaids by the Philipinnes’ government. Another explicit 
reference to competition is available in Shah (2012) that mentioned that labour supply 
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from various Asian and Non-Asian countries (e.g. Ethiopia) keeps the wage in the 
Gulf low. From the above it appears that the labour sending countries in the Gulf are 
setting their policies unilaterally. The receiving countries of the Gulf in this regard are 
more organised. They together have formed Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that 
addresses the demand as well as the management issues of the migrants. They follow 
a system called Kafala in which migrants need sponsorship from a permanent resident 
of the Gulf (Longva, 1999, Wickramasekara 2016 ). However, there exists no such 
coalition of the labour sending countries.  
 The observations mentioned above show the need to direct a study to evaluate 
the economic effects of competition in international labour market. Chowdhury 
(2014) developed a model of competition for international migration where labour 
markers are integrated. In an integrated labour market, people can move from one 
country to another country without explicit participations of the governments. 
However if labour markets are not integrated, as in most of the cases, labour often has 
to migrate via governments’ channels. 
 Hence, this paper develops a model, similar to Chowdhury (2014) where two 
countries export labour to a third country to receive remittances. However, instead of 
direct migration by the individuals, the migrants’ number is decided by the sending 
countries with a view to maximise the national incomes. In doing so, the two sending 
countries act as Cournot-type competitors. The receiving country uses tax policies to 
fulfil its national objectives and designs the policies foreseeing the labour export of 
the two countries. The tax rates are regarded as proxies of various monetary and non-
monetary barriers/costs involved in migration which are above the administrative 
costs in the receiving country. Though the literature is still limited, the analysis of 
optimal policies of the sending and receiving countries with government managed 
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programmes received attention of a number of papers i.e. Schiff (2007), Djajić et al. 
(2012) and Djajić (2013) which analyse policy interactions between host and source 
countries with guest-workers programmes. Chowdhury (2014) analyses the optimal 
policies of the host and source countries when labour markets are integrated. 
Chowdhury and Mukherjee (2015) analyses how labour market integration affects the 
welfare of consumers through increased research and development. The main aim of 
the current paper, on the other hand, is to analyse the optimal policy of the host 
country when source countries compete with each other for the share of international 
labour market through government managed programmes. 
 We observe often, that the receiving country controls the number of migrants 
using quota or quantity restriction. The paper, instead, assumes that the sending 
countries can send as many as they want to the receiving country.  This assumption 
limits the policy variables available to the sending countries, however, assists to 
isolate some interesting effects of competition in a simple and tractable way. One is 
the use of discriminatory tax policy by the receiving country on the basis of labour 
endowment where the country with the highest labour endowment pays the highest 
per capita tax. Comi and Grasseni (2012) found in 9 European countries that workers 
with the same characteristics as permanent workers would receive lower wages if they 
worked on temporary contracts. Our results suggest that the receiving country may 
also discriminate on the basis of the country of origin. The result is consistent with the 
notions of competition and market power mentioned in IOM (2003).  
 The idea of the competition comes from Chau and Kanbur (2006) that 
modelled the competition between two Southern countries in labour standards and 
showed that the Northern importing country can take the benefit away from the 
Southern countries by increasing tax rates. Instead of labour standard, we assume that 
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the countries compete by sending labour. The model of this article is aligned with the 
modelling practices of strategic trade policy literature, especially of Brander and 
Spencer (1985). Some papers have incorporated import tax in the Brander-Spencer 
framework and this article bears some similarities with them. 
 International migration has many dimensions and it should be noted that it is 
impossible to capture all of that in a single paper. In the paper, we make no attempt to 
address issues like brain drain, migration networks, migration cost, illegal migration 
or the motives of remittances. Our analysis is therefore partial in essence and aiming 
for a tractable analysis capable of providing a simple and qualitative understanding of 
an issue, i.e. competition of countries in international labour market. A detailed 
survey of the recent international migration literature is available in Docquier and 
Rapoport (2012). We note also that the international migration literature is still highly 
biased in analysing only the developed receiving countries’ benefit and cost. There is 
a great need for works that address issues at par with the need of the developing 
countries
1
. This need has been greatly ignored by the existing literature on the 
‘economics of immigration’.  
 The organisation of the remaining sections of the paper is as follows. The 
second section introduces the model, basic notations and clarifies the mechanism of 
labour migration. The third section deals with some comparative statics results. The 
forth section discusses the imposition of tax rates by the importing country. The fifth 
or the last section concludes the paper. 
 
                                                 
1
 A similar view with reference of the migration in the Gulf has been expressed by Oommen (2015). 
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2. The Model 
 
2.1. Basic Assumptions and Notations 
 
The basis assumptions and notations of the model are similar to Chowdhury 
(2014). We assume that there are three open economies C , I  and U  that produce 
two internationally traded goods 1X  and 2X . The prices of the goods are fixed. The 
units are selected in a way that relative price of one unit of a good is equal to 1. 
Endowments of labour are fixed, denoted by iL  for country },{ ICi  and uL  for 
country U . The technologies and labour endowments of the countries are such that 
country C  and I  specialise in production of good 1 and country U  specialises in 
production of good 2. Hence the wage rates in C  and I  are the values of marginal 
products of labour in producing good 1 in these two countries. Similarly wage rate in 
U  is given by the value of marginal product of labour in producing good 2 in U . The 
assumption of specialisation simplifies the analysis.  
 The wage rate of country U  is assumed to be greater than the wage rates of C  
and I  which initiates migration. Migrants repatriate all the income to the home 
country. The national income of the home is the production of 1X  plus remittances 
received. Preferences are such that the countries always consume both goods, export 
the goods in which they specialise, and import the others. This pattern of comparative 
advantage is assumed not to be altered by migration
1
. The prices are assumed to be 
fixed throughout. 
                                                 
1
 We note that as migration effects the production and consumption of goods, it may also effect the 
world price levels and may reverse the pattern of the specialisation and wage differentials. As the aim 
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 To facilitate further analysis, assume for  ICi , , that the production of 1X  
is given as 
2
1
1
111
2
iii L
b
LaX  , where 1iX  denotes the amount of 1X  produced in i , 
1iL  is total amount of labour used in production of 1X , 1a  and 1b  are positive 
coefficients. Differentiating with respect to 1iL , the value of the marginal product of 
labour in 1X  is obtained as 111 iLba  .  
 The production of 2X  in  ICi ,  is given by 222 ii LaX  , where 2a  is the 
amount of labour required to produce one unit of 2X  and 2iL  is the amount of labour 
required for 2X .  Differentiating with respect to 2iL , the value of marginal product of 
labour is obtained as 2a . Country i  specialises in 1X  if the value of marginal product 
of labour in 1X  is greater than the value of marginal product of labour in 2X . That is, 
iff 2111 aLba i  . Assume this holds, thus i  throughout specialises in production of 
1X . Without migration the wage rate of i  is ii Lbaw 11  . 
On the other hand, assume that country U  has a linear production technology 
in producing 1X ,  given by 111 uuu LaX   where 1uL  is the amount of labour used and 
1ua  is the coefficient. The value of the marginal product of labour is 1ua . The 
production function of 2X  is 
2
2
2
222
2
u
u
uuu L
b
LaX  , where 2uL  is the amount of 
labour used in production of 2X  in U . The value of the marginal product of labour in 
                                                                                                                                            
of the analysis is not to evaluate the welfare from trade and/or modification of comparative advantage, 
we assume fixed prices throughout to keep the analysis simple. The assumption of fixed prices also 
allows working with national income equation instead of a welfare function, as when prices are fixed, 
higher income implies higher welfare. Note that the world may consist of many goods, factors and 
countries whereas the paper works with only three countries, two goods and one factor. Our analysis, 
therefore, is partial and restrictive. The incorporation of more countries, goods and factors may change 
the results substantially. These assumptions and the functional forms selected are identical to 
Chowdhury (2014). 
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2X  is 222 uuu Lba  . Country U  specialises in production of 2X  iff 1222 uuuu aLba  . 
Assume this assumption holds and therefore U  specialises in production of 2X  
throughout. Without migration, the workers of country U  receive wage 
uuuu Lbaw 22  . 
 With migration, the wage rate in U  is  2222 ICuuuu LLLbaw  . As 
assumed 1uu aw  , hence U  still specialises in production of good 2X  after 
migration. Also assume that iuuu LbaLba 1122   as such, without migration, the 
wage received by labour in country U  is higher than that of C  and I , which initiates 
migration. 
 The timing is as follows. First the importing country, that is, country U  sets 
its tax policies for migration. Given the tax rates, C  and I  send labour to U  to 
receive remittances and maximise national income. It is possible for C  and I  to send 
all the labour to U  if wage gaps are large enough. To avoid such an extreme 
situation, we assume that migration equilibrium is reached well in advance of that. 
 
 
 
2.2. Defining the Mechanism of Migration  
 
 This section defines the mechanism through which migration takes place. We 
assume that the governments of sending countries determine the outflow of migrants. 
This assumption may seem unreal at first look but is capable of capturing the 
migration of labour, from the Asian and Latin American countries to the rich and 
developed countries. 
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 The potential migrants of a developing country face mainly two barriers of 
migration. First, the labour markets are not integrated and secondly accessibility of 
job market information. For example, assume that a construction firm in the Middle 
East needs 1000 manual workers and it wants to recruit workers from countries like 
India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan or the Philippines. How the firm will recruit the 
workers? In most of the times, it is not possible to recruit these workers directly by 
publishing advertisement in the newspapers and internet. To overcome this problem, 
firms recruit workers from these countries through recruiting agencies operating at 
grass roots levels.  
 This recruitment process is now disfavoured by most countries. The 
employment contracts are often very abusive, the recruiters/agents often take high 
document processing fees, give false documents and do not ensure return migration 
(Oommen 2015, Wickramasekara 2016). The benefit of migration is often 
misappropriated by the middlemen. Hence governments are stepping in to control the 
labour recruitment process. Through inter-governmental negotiations, governments 
now establish the rules to govern migration related issues. The bilateral migration 
agreements observed worldwide depict direct involvement and interest of 
governments in this matter. In many countries, migration can now take place only 
through direct involvement of respective governments. In Canada’s Seasonal 
Agricultural Workers Program, Canada mentions yearly demand to respective 
government authorities of Mexico and Caribbean countries. In reply Mexican and 
Caribbean governments facilitate recruitment according to the Canadian requirement 
(Verma, 2003). South Korea is now recruiting labour through ‘Employment Permit 
System (EPS)’ where workers are recruited only through the respective government 
bodies (see, www.eps.go.kr.index.html). 
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 In the paper, we overlook the possibility of imposition of a quota or a yearly 
demand that predetermine the number of migrants and instead assuming the sending 
countries can send as many as they like. This assumption however allows us to 
evaluate the policy responses of the receiving country in a simple and tractable way in 
line with the objective of the paper
2
. 
 Another argument could be that even if the governments of sending countries 
have direct interest, it is the individual migrants who decide whether they want to 
migrate or not. The model ensures that the net income of the migrants is higher than 
the wage rates at the countries of origin. We clarify it in the section 2.3. 
 
 
2.3. National Income Equations and Solutions of Migration 
 
We assume the following national income equations of the sending countries, 
 
       22222
2
2
1
21
2
iijiuuuiiiii LTLLLbaLL
b
LLaY 





       (1) 
where, 
},{ ICi  and ji  . 
iY = National income of i . 
2iL = Migrants from country i . 
2jL = Migrants from country j . 
iT = Tax imposed by country U on the migrants of country i . 
                                                 
2
 It will be interesting to have a model of bargaining involving negotiations of different stakeholders. 
In future attempts will be made to extend the analysis further in this direction.  
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 The above equation has two parts. The first part is the output produced within 
the country. The second part is the remittances sent by the workers working in U . 
The remittances are nothing but after tax income multiplied by total migrants. It is 
also assumed that migrants send the entire wage back to the home country. In reality 
migrants do keep some income in the country of immigration, buy properties or make 
investments. We are however assuming full repatriation of income to keep the 
analysis simple. Full repatriation of income also captures temporariness.  
 It is also assumed that the receiving country imposes taxes on the income of 
migrants. These taxes are proxies of immigration related monetary and non- monetary 
costs imposed by the country of immigration which are above the administrative costs 
of allowing immigration. This tax reflects the fact that in many parts of the world, 
migrants must pay taxes but may not receive equal benefit in return. These are 
particularly applicable to the temporary migrants. They often cannot to access various 
social, health and educational support programmes of the governments until have 
become legally permanent, but remain subject to payment of all type of taxes, as the 
permanent residents, for the whole period of stay.   
 The receiving country collects tax to be redistributed to the natives. When 
forming the strategies, the sending countries take the tax rates into consideration. The 
objective of the sending country i  is to maximise the national income with respect to 
2iL . The country assumes that the other country keeps the number of migrant labours 
the same. Differentiating with respect to 2iL  and setting the derivatives equal to zero 
following two reaction functions for country C  and I  are obtained, 
 
      222211221 2 IuCuuuCCu LbTLbaLbaLbb    (2) 
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      222211221 2 CuIuuuIIu LbTLbaLbaLbb    (3) 
  
The reaction functions can be written in a manner to show that the wage 
received by migrants minus taxes are higher than the wages that can be obtained at 
home, which ensures that workers have incentive to migrate.  Foreign wage minus 
taxes actually show the incomes of the migrants. It must be higher than the wages or 
marginal products at the home that is the marginal costs of the labour export. 
 The two equations can be solved for 2CL and 2IL . The second derivatives 
satisfy the required conditions for maximisation. The solutions obtained are,  
 
  221
1
2 2 uIuCC bBbbBZL 

     (4) 
and, 
  221
1
2 2 uCuII bBbbBZL 

     (5) 
where,  
2
2211 )(3)4( uu bbbbZ   
    iuuuii TLbaLbaB  2211  
 
 1Z  is the inverse of Z . From the two solutions it is not possible to identify 
which country exports more labour. It depends on the amount of initial labour 
endowments and the tax rates. In later sections we will see how tax rates are imposed 
by country U .  
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3. Comparative Statics 
 
 This section analyses how changes in the tax policy of U  effects the income 
and labour export of i . We describe the comparative statics results first and then 
illustrate how they have been derived.  
 
Proposition 1: If tax rate ( iT ) of a country increases then the labour export from 
that country decreases but the labour export from the other country increases. The 
total labour export decreases. 
 
Proof: 
 Assume that only tax rate for country i  has been changed. Differentiating the 
reaction functions of equations (2) and (3) with respect to iT  we get, 
 
  12 22221 






i
j
u
i
i
u
T
L
b
T
L
bb      
  02 22122 





i
j
u
i
i
u
T
L
bb
T
L
b  
 
 From the equations, the solutions obtained are, 
 
  02 21
12 

 
u
i
i bbZ
T
L
 
and, 
02
12 



u
i
j
bZ
T
L
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 Therefore, if the tax rate of a country is increased by U  then labour export 
from that country decreases but labour export from the other country increases. 
Adding the two we obtain, 
 
  021
122 




 
u
i
j
i
i bbZ
T
L
T
L
 
 
 Thus the overall labour export decreases.□ 
 
 The proposition (1) can be expressed using the following Figure. 
 
 
Insert Fig.1 here 
 
 
 In Fig.1 the country I ’s reaction function is given by line (1) and country 
C ’s reaction function is given by line (2). The equilibrium of labour supply is given 
by A  where the two reaction functions intersect. Assume that the tax rate for country 
C  has been increased by U . As can be observed from equation (2), this reduces the 
intercept and shifts C ’s reaction function leftward. The new reaction function is 
denoted by (3). At the new equilibrium B , the labour export from I  increases and 
the labour export from C  decreases, but together the labour export decreases. The 
proposition comes directly from the requirement of the stability of the system. For 
stability it is required that the labour export should be in absolute value more 
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responsive to the changes in own tax rate than the changes in the other country’s tax 
rate.  
 
 
Proposition 2: If U  increases the tax rate of a country, the national income of that 
country decreases and that of the other country increases. 
 
Proof: 
  
 Differentiating the income equation of i  with respect to iT  and using the first 
order condition
3
 in equations (2) or (3) we obtain, 
 
02
2
22 





i
i
j
iu
i
i L
T
L
Lb
T
Y
 
 
 Similarly differentiating the income equation of j  with respect to jT  and 
using the first order condition, 
 
0222 





i
i
ju
i
j
T
L
Lb
T
Y
 
 
 Consequently, the national income of i  decreases and the national income of 
j  increases as iT  increases. □ 
 
                                                 
3
       02 2222211  ijiuuuii TLLLbaLLba  
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 The proposition shows how the tax policy followed by the country U  effects 
the national income of the two labour exporting countries. A marginal increase in tax 
rate of i  reduces remittances, thereby the national income of i  falls. The country i  
reduces the labour export. Therefore labour export and remittances received by j  
increases. 
 We may also want to see what happens to the national output of U  with the 
increase in the tax rate. The national output equation of U  is, 
 
   2
22
2
222
2
jiu
u
jiuuU LLL
b
LLLaY      (6) 
 
 By differentiating with respect to iT  we obtain, 
 
   













i
j
i
i
jiuuu
i
U
T
L
T
L
LLLba
T
Y 22
2222
 
 
 The right side of the above equation is negative as obtained from proposition 
(1). Therefore the total output of U  falls i.e. 0


i
U
T
Y
.                                                                                                                              
 
 
4. Determination of Tax Rates by the Importing Country 
 
 The paper has until now analysed the effects of tax policies on the labour 
migration and the national incomes of the sending countries. In this section we turn 
our attention to the receiving country. It brings us to the first stage of the game, where 
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U  sets the tax policies foreseeing the labour exports of C  and I . The tax policy, in 
addition, also depends on the national objectives of the receiving country. We have 
seen that the imposition of tax reduces the national output of U . The tax therefore 
must have other purposes. Sometimes the presence of a strong lobby is regarded as 
the reason for the use of a high import barrier. The same applies to the labour import. 
For example, a strong trade union or a lobby of workers may disfavour immigration. 
A lobby of capitalists may favour immigration. Some policies may increase the 
income of the whole nation whereas some policies may increase the income of a 
particular group. In the following proposition we look at such a motive of the 
imposition of tax.      
 
 
Proposition 3: The receiving country may not always impose a positive tax rate to 
maximise the income of the permanent residents.  
 
Proof: 
 To depict what is meant by the proposition, we first define the income 
equation of the permanent residents. The income of the permanent residents is given 
by the total national output minus the remittances that is, 
 
 22
,
2
,
222
2
,
2
2
,
22
2
jjii
CIi
i
CIi
iuuu
CIi
iu
u
CIi
iuuUN LTLTLLLbaLL
b
LLaY 









































 

 
(7) 
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 To prove the proposition, let us assume that only the tax rate for country i  has 
been changed. Differentiating equation (7) with respect to iT  and assuming that tax 
the rates are initially zero we obtain, 
 
 
2
22
222 i
i
j
i
i
jiu
i
UN L
T
L
T
L
LLb
T
Y
















      (8) 
 
 Thus the first part of the equation is negative but as 2iL  is positive the 
expression in total can have negative or positive sign. Thus when tax rates are zero, 
imposition of positive tax rates do not necessarily increase the income of the residents 
of U . □ 
 
 Further calculations with equation (8) do not clearly depict what is happening. 
The result however depends on the size of the relative labour import. To see it let us 
assume 121  ubb , hence    222
4
1
iji
i
UN LLL
T
Y



. Therefore if 22 3 ij LL   then 
the imposition of a positive tax on i  hurts U . 
 The result is not unexpected but interestingly it depends largely on the 
responsiveness of the two countries to the changed tax rates. The income of the 
residents here is calculated by deducting the wages of migrants and adding the tax 
revenues to the national output. We saw before that the national output falls if the tax 
rate increases. Additionally as migration decreases, the wage of workers increases. 
Hence the output minus the wage of migrants falls. The country experiences an 
increase in the per capita tax revenue. If the increase in tax revenue can compensate 
for the loss of output minus remittances, the national income increases. It is 
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interesting to note that the negativity or positivity of the expression depends on the 
relative magnitude of 
i
i
T
L

 2  and 
i
j
T
L

 2
. We already know that the summation of these 
two terms is negative. The imposition of tax rate reduces the income of U  if the gap 
between them is sufficiently larger, that is if labour supply from i  decreases but the 
labour supply from j  does not increase by that extent. But if the gap between the two 
is close to zero then a positive tax may be proved beneficial for U . The proposition 
implies that U  may also use subsidies to improve the national income of the 
permanent residents. 
The above proposition shows that the receiving country may not always 
follow the policy of a positive tax rate. However we have not yet seen how the 
competition of the countries effects the tax policy. To analyse this we work with a 
relatively simple case where U  aims to maximise the income of the permanent 
workers
4
. It is obvious that in this case U  uses a positive tax rate. This is nonetheless 
important as often the welfare of the native workers is given the highest weight in 
designing the immigration policy. A common perception is that the permanent 
workers income that is wage rate is the highest when there is no migration and for 
mainly this reason immigration receives objection from the native population. But it is 
often not reasonable for a country to completely prohibit migration. To cover for the 
loss of native workers, a country may offer some extra facilities and a part of these 
may come from the migrants, especially temporary workers. It is possible if the tax 
policy is designed in a way where migrant workers pay more tax relative to the 
benefits received.  
 The income equation of the permanent labour is, 
                                                 
4
 It implies that labour is not the only factor of production. The capital can be a hidden factor. How this 
tax policy effects the capitalists is an interesting topic but this paper does not explore it further. 
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where LUY  is the income of the permanent workers. As shown in the above equation, 
U  now maximises the sum of the wages of the permanent workers and tax revenues. 
By evaluating the derivative when iT  is zero we obtain, 
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 Thus the imposition of tax increases the income of workers when tax rates are 
zero. The result differs from that of equation (7) where we looked at the whole 
national income. 
 With the assumption that the aim of government is to maximise the income of 
permanent workers, it is relatively easy to calculate the optimal tax rates for the 
exporting countries. The calculation is given in the appendix. The optimal solution is 
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2
1
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where  ICi , . iT  is positive as by assumption iu Lbaa 112 
5
. From the equation 
it can be seen that the country with more labour endowment pays more tax, the 
                                                 
5
 It is possible that tax rate is so high that the labour export is zero. To ensure interior solution we 
assume that the parameters of the model are such that, 
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country endowed with less labour pays less tax. The above solution and the solutions 
for labour exports can be expressed by the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4: The country with the highest labour endowment pays the highest tax 
rate and supplies more labour. The labour supply of a country increases (decreases) 
if labour endowment of that country increases (decreases) and decreases 
(increases) if labour endowment of the other country increases (decreases). 
 
Proof:  
 Equation (10) shows that the country with the highest labour endowment pays 
the highest tax rate. By substituting iT  and jT  in equations (4) and (5) and after 
necessary calculation (shown in appendix) we obtain, 
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Z
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 If ji LL   then the sign of the equation (11) is positive. That is ji LL   
implies that i  pays more tax and exports more labour.  
 The solution of the labour export is given in the appendix (equation A1). From 
that it can be seen that the labour export of a country increases with a decrease of the 
other country’s labour endowment and decreases with the increase of the other 
country’s labour endowment. The labour export increases with the increase of own 
labour endowment and decreases with the decrease of own labour endowment.  □ 
 An intuitive explanation of the proposition (4) can be provided as follows. The 
workers of a labour endowed country receive lower wages in their home country. 
 23 
Thus the difference between wages received in U  and in the own country is highest 
for the country with the highest labour endowment. Therefore, U  extracts a higher 
rent by imposing a higher tax rate. As the labour supply is not perfectly inelastic, the 
importing country U  can exercise power when buying labour. Here the relation 
between the labour supply and the tax rate is downward sloping, which is similar to 
the revenue function of a monopolist. With a downward sloping demand a monopolist 
charges a higher price to the buyer with a lower elasticity of demand. A similar result 
has also been obtained in our analysis, 
 
 
Proposition 5: The country with the highest labour endowment has the lowest tax 
elasticity of labour supply. If labour endowment of a country increases (decreases) 
then the labour supply of the other country becomes more elastic (inelastic).    
 
Proof:  
 The elasticity is defined as 
i
i
i
i
Tii
T
L
T
L 22


  where Tii  is the own tax elasticity 
of labour supply of the country i . As 
i
i
T
L

 2  is same for both countries, the elasticity 
depends on how the ratio 
i
i
T
L 2  changes with the changes of labour endowments. In the 
appendix we obtain, 
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 The first terms of the expressions are negative, but in total the expressions 
must be positive because of the positivity of tax rates and labour supplies. By 
deducting (shown in the appendix) we obtain 
j
j
i
i
T
L
T
L 22   when ji LL  . Thus, the 
country with the highest labour endowment has the lowest tax elasticity of labour 
supply.  
 From equation (12), we observe that if jL  increases (decreases) then 
i
i
T
L 2  
decreases (increases) and the labour supply become more elastic (inelastic).□ 
  The proposition has important policy implications. It is known that a 
monopolist varies price until the demand becomes inelastic. Here we observe that 
when the labour endowment of a country increases, the labour supply of the other 
country becomes more elastic. It delivers a greater power to the importing country in 
extracting rent. 
 Here we may point to the similarity of our paper with Brander and Spencer’s 
analysis (Brander and Spencer, 1985). Brander and Spencer proposed a similar model 
where two countries export goods to a third country and analysed the optimum export 
tax/subsidy strategies of the exporting countries. Some papers have extended Brander 
and Spencer’s analysis to include the importing country’s policy response, i.e. Gatsios 
(1990) and Hwang and Mai (1991). In general it has been found that if the importing 
country practises discriminatory tariff policy, then the tariff rate is the highest for the 
most cost efficient exporter. Similarly, in our paper, the most cost efficient sending 
country (opportunity cost of migration is low) sends more migrants and pays the 
highest per capita tax. This result is also analogous to that obtained in Chowdhury 
(2014). 
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 As the analysis of the paper is mainly theoretical, the empirical validity of the 
findings needs to be established through further analysis. We observe that migrants do 
pay taxes in many forms but such taxes are apparently the same for all type of 
migrants. To find out the evidences of discriminatory tax rates, one needs to look at 
monetary and non monetary conditions attached to entry and access to social services. 
The results indicate that the sending countries’ labour markets and bargaining 
positions effect the imposition of the tax rates. An empirical analysis relating the 
policies of the receiving countries with the labour market conditions of the sending 
countries will be useful in delivering further insight on this matter. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 This paper analysed a model where two countries compete with each other to 
export labour to a third country. The concept of competition and cooperation is still a 
new idea in international migration. International bodies are encouraging and 
facilitating dialogues between countries in international migration issues. These 
dialogues may in the near future pave the way for a global consensus on migration.  
 In order to understand how international migration works it is important to 
consider the interests of different stakeholders of migration. Our paper could be useful 
to shed some light on this issue. In the paper, two countries aimed to maximise 
national incomes by sending workers to a third country. We observed that the 
importing country used discriminatory tax rates and the country with the highest 
labour endowment encountered the highest per capita tax rate. Though the result was 
theoretical, it indicated that the receiving countries may, in reality, practise 
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discriminatory policies. One way the sending counties can retaliate is through 
collusion, that is, by jointly controlling the labour export. We have not analysed 
collusion in this paper but the exporting countries’ collusion is by far an unobserved 
matter in international migration. Instead, we observe joint management and control 
of migration by the receiving countries. The Kafala system in the Gulf and the point 
based migration system followed by some developed countries are as examples of 
joint migration management by the importing countries. 
 The analysis of this paper has important policy implications. As international 
migration is important for many developing economies, the result of the paper 
suggested for the need of a collaborative effort of the Southern labour exporting 
countries in international migration issues. There is also a significant need for 
empirical works directed towards a detailed understanding of the subject matter i.e. 
the effects of competition for international migration on the policies of the receiving 
countries. Though our paper has not directly addressed, it is also linked to the 
question of the effectiveness of a foreign remittances dependent economic 
development policy that recently has been raised by other researchers (Hugo 2012, 
Wickramasekara 2016). 
 International migration is important for both developed and developing 
countries. In developed countries it helps to meet the shortage of manpower. In 
developing countries, it can increase national income and reduce the poverty level. 
However, the developing countries often do not realise how their unilateral labour 
export policies limit the potential benefit of migration and lead to higher exploitation. 
International migration is a multilateral issue involving both labour exporting and 
importing countries. Such a realisation is required for future initiatives linking 
migration and economic development. 
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Appendix 
 
Optimal Tax rates 
 
 To find the optimal rates of taxes, we differentiate equation (9) with respect to 
CT and IT  and set the derivatives equal to zero, 
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 The second derivatives from equation (9) are 
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where    22211 34 uu bbbbZ   
 
 Setting the derivatives equal to zero and after necessary calculations we 
obtain, 
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 Solving using Cramer’s rule 
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 Now substituting the solutions in equation (4) , 
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Similarly 2IL  is obtained from equation (5). Deducting them we get, 
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We assume that the value of the parameters of the model are such that 02 iL  
 
Calculation of elasticity 
 
 We will only show the calculation of 
C
C
T
L 2  in detail, 
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 Calculating the ratio for the other country and by deducting we get, 
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As IC LL  or IC TT  , the expression has a positive sign. 
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